XI. General Remarks
This in general is our strategic view of the liberation of Palestine. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine adopts this strategy as a general guide of action. We must stress, however, that the correctness of any theoretical analysis is contingent upon its success on the field of practical application. It is only by revolutionary experience that the scientific answer to, the correctness or incorrectness of any political theoretical analysis is given, and no theoretical analytical attempt can provide fully from the outset a comprehensive view of things. The relation between thought and revolutionary action is a dialectical one. Thought directs revolutionary action which in turn produces results, situations and reactions which influence the theoretical view of things.
On this basis, to the extent we stress these strategic lines as a guide to our action, we at the same time assert that we will not understand them in fixed static forms. The experience itself will deepen and crystallise this view, enrich it and complete it in some of its aspects. It will also develop this view and may modify some of its aspects. Such a view of this strategy is the scientific dialectical view which rejects immobility and rigidity, undertakes criticism and self-criticism from time to time, benefits from experience and establishes between thought and revolutionary action an organic and reactive link which enlarges and deepens thought so that it will come to guide action in a more proper and more correct manner. Any other view is, in point of fact, idealistic and rigid, leading to failure.
Looking at it from another angle, this strategy represents a general view of the battle and its main trends and consequently does not stop at many of the details, inter-links and sinuosities which will fill every phase of the battle and accompany each of its lines. For instance, in our definition of the main line of conflict, we have not stopped at the lines of conflict which will exist and react among the enemy forces themselves, or within the ranks of the revolutionary forces. Thus our definition of Israel as one of the enemy forces is not intended to convey a static picture of this force. Israel does not represent a homogeneous unity within which there is no room for conflict. There will be within Israel more than one politico-social force and there will be conflict among these forces. The intensity of these conflicts may at times rise or fall according the progress and phase of the battle. Although the conflict now existing within Israel between the so-called “hawks” and “doves” does not leave any appreciable effect on the image of the battle, yet the more radical conflicts within Israel. which are now dormant, may come out and gain in intensity during coming periods. Similarly, when we say that there is an organic connection between Israel and imperialism we do not mean that there are no latent partial conflicts between them. Moreover, we witness at this time a conflict between Israel and the reactionary regime in Jordan which sometimes considers its conflict with the resistance to be less significant with regard to it than its conflict with Israel. Also, we witness at this time the willingness of the Palestinian bourgeoisie outside the occupied areas to financially support the resistance movement.
On the other side of the picture there will also be a group of conflicts. The picture of the conflicts existing among the Palestinian armed organizations is clear at this time. Besides, the alliance between the Palestinian liberation movement and regional and Arab revolutionary action will not be entirely smooth and devoid of any conflict. Furthermore, in our presentation of the popular liberation war formula as the revolutionary formula for confrontation with the enemy, we must not fail to remember the fact that the conventional Arab armies of the national regimes will, in defending themselves as well as in their tactical attacks, play for a long time a military role which may at times appear as the leading role on the stage of events although in the long-run, strategically, it is the revolutionary force which will remain behind Israel and world imperialism until radical national liberation is completed.
The main line of conflict defined by this strategy is not a straight geometric line with two conflicting forces standing on either side. It is in reality a crooked dialectical line on each side of which stands a group of allied forces co-existing under the shadow of this alliance. At times this alliance grows stronger and at other times the conflicts among them grow more pronounced so that the picture becomes sometimes a mixed and interwoven image moving along the two sides of the main line of conflict. Inasmuch as it is important and fundamental to see at every stage of the struggle the accurate and detailed picture which will enable us to determine our tactical step in a scientific manner, it is equally important and fundamental that our detailed tactical view at each stage be guided by our long term strategic view. It is this strategic view which will enable us to lead and direct the struggle and to avoid falling into the error of experimentation, impulsiveness, drifting behind events or reacting to events instead of acting to direct them.
In the light of this understanding, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine adopts this politico-strategic analysis as a guide for its action in the liberation war which the Front is facing and for which it is preparing.